Administrative Corruption in Spain: Land, Money and Mayors

Spain provides a fascinating case for the exploration of political corruption in a modern well-established democracy. Following the urban development boom of the 2000s, Spain’s public sector was plagued with corruption. This essay seeks to understand why numerous town council scandals connected to urban abuse suddenly flooded the national headlines in this time period. It argues that the opportunity structure for corrupt practices at the time was enhanced as a result of both the nature of the legal framework for urban planning and a period of rapid modernisation and economic growth in Spain. In addition, the essay briefly explores potential links between an increase in perceived levels of corruption in Spain and the increased visibility of corruption in the mass media.

First and foremost, it is important to outline what corruption means and what types of corrupt practices will be considered. Corruption is here understood as the misuse of public office by public officials for private gain over the common good (Della Porta 2004). This study focuses on corruption occurring within the public sector, including corrupt practices by elected politicians and public sector employees (administrative corruption).

In order to understand the roots of political corruption in Spain during the building boom of the early 2000s it is essential that we first situate Spain within its historical context. Francisco Franco’s death in 1975 marked the end of a dictatorship in Spain that lasted forty-five years. This was followed by rapid political, social and economic change. Spain transitioned to democracy, was admitted into the European Union in 1986, and adopted the euro as its currency in 2002. The end of the dictatorial rule also marked the decentralisation of the government. The political authority of the centre was loosened devolving government authority to “newly empowered regions called autonomous communities” (Almendral 2002). While these changes reflect radical shifts in Spain’s political and economic standpoint, social and cultural changes at the political grassroots lagged behind. Although public officials in regional and local levels of government enjoyed new autonomy and control of land use and infrastructures, political constraints (rigorously implemented at the political centre) lacked clear implementation at this level: “the principle of municipal autonomy has largely given rise to the disappearance of political opportunity criteria and guardianship for the control the activities of the local authorities by other political authorities” (Jimenez et al 2012, 377). Consequently, the extent of democratisation and norm regulation varies from one political administration to another.

To make matters worse, the legal framework in Spain places urban planning decisions in the hands of town councils and mayors: “the mayor is the authority in issuing building permits, which developers need to apply for in advance before beginning construction, as well as in sanctioning any illegal procedures” (Villoria et al 2012, 87). Under the reforms of the Land Law in 1998, implemented by Aznar’s government, mayors were authorised to convert land officially deemed as rural or agricultural (banned from construction) into urban land, enabling expropriation. In addition, in spite of making some important modifications, the 2007 Land Law did not solve the problem of land speculation and political corruption promulgated by the 1956 Francoist law framework (Jimenez et al 2012, 367). It continued to motivate speculation and corruption by stipulating that in the case of expropriation rural land made into urban land “would be given a value as if it were already fully developed (urbanized and built on) simply by virtue of the municipal plan being approved” (Villoria et al 2012, 87).

These factors in combination with fast progress in urban development and increased property values set the foundations for an outburst of corruption in the public sector. In November 2009, the head of the Prosecution Ministry stated that his office was “investigating almost 750 cases of government corruption, with more than 800 public officials involved…In general, almost all of the recent corruption cases were related to land classification and construction permits granted by regional and local government officials” (Jimenez et al 2012, 375; Villoria et al 2012, 87). The urban development boom fomented the creation of clientelistic ties at the local administrative level. The ‘strong-mayor system’ gave rise to corrupt exchanges between elected politicians at the local level and construction and building companies. In 2005 alone 800.000 homes were built in Spain, as many as in France, Germany and United Kingdom combined (Galindo 2005, 1). The abundance in properties, however, did not cheapen their price. On the contrary, the price of housing increased in the following years as the public itself engaged with property speculation.

As Villoria et al point out, the fact that corruption in local government was becoming an increasingly important problem in Spain, affecting “almost 40 per cent of the country’s most important municipalities (with more than 90 per cent of the population)” (Villoria et al 2012, 88) did not go unnoticed by the mass media. The media played a key role in disseminating information about politically corrupt cases nationwide (Castells 2010). Analyses by the Spanish research institute (CIS 2010) show that 900 news stories about political corruption in Spain were published in Spain’s most prominent newspapers from September 2008 to June 2010, making corruption “the second most frequently covered topic in these papers during the period” (Villoria et al 2012, 88). Increase visibility of government corruption in the mass media most likely had negative effects on state-citizenry relations: “perceptions of corruption in Spain increased dramatically from 2005 to 2009, rising by at least 15 percentage points for local institutions and 17 percentage points for regional and national institutions” (Villoria et al 2012, 88).

The problem needs to be tackled ‘from its roots’. If the necessary measures and structures required to enforce the existing rules continue to be non-existent it is likely that the same mistakes will be made again once the Spanish economy begins to recover (Solana 2014, 3).

Word Count: 987

Cited sources:

Almendral, V., 2002. Fiscal Federalism in Spain: The Assignment of Taxation Powers to the Autonomous Communities. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/9200/fiscal_ruiz_ET_2002.pdf (Accessed 17/03/2019).

Castells, M., 1998. La era de la información. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Della Porta, D., 2004. Political parties and corruption: Ten hypotheses on five vicious circles. Crime, Law & Social Change, 42, 34-60.

Galindo, C., 2005. El año de las 800.000 nuevas viviendas. El País. https://elpais.com/diario/2005/12/11/economia/1134255601_850215.html (Accessed: 10/03/2019).

Jiménez, F., Villoria, M., and Quesada, M., 2012. Badly Designed Institutions, Informal Rules and Perverse Incentives: Local Government Corruption in Spain. Journal of Local Self-Government. 10(4), 363-381.

Solana, P., 2014. Una investigación atribuye la corrupción urbanística en España a un "diseño institucional fallido. eldiario.es. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/investigacion-urbanistica-Espana-transparencia-institucional_0_288021440.html (Accessed: 12/03/2019)

Villoria, M., Ryzin. G., and Lavena, R., 2013. Social and Political Consequences of Administrative Corruption: A Study of Public Perceptions in Spain. Public Administration Review, 73(1), 85-94.